Recent empirical work on the concept of intentionality suggests that people’s assessments of whether an action is intentional are subject to uncertainty. Some researchers have gone so far as to claim that different people employ different concepts of intentional action. These possibilities have motivated a good deal of work in the relatively new field of experimental philosophy. The findings from this empirical research may prove to be relevant to medical ethics. In this article, we address this issue head on. We (...) first describe a study we conducted on intention ascription. Drawing on recent work in experimental philosophy, we investigated the possibility that the ascription of intentions to clinical actors in clinical settings is influenced by prior judgments about the goodness or badness of the consequences of the action in question. Our study was modeled on experimental studies in other contexts that have shown that people, when presented with a range of scenarios, are more likely to classify a side effect of an action as intended if the side effect is negative or reflects poorly on the actor than if it is positive or reflects well on the actor. We investigated whether this asymmetry in intention ascriptions was also present among physicians who were asked to ascribe intentions to clinical actors in certain well-defined clinical scenarios. After describing the study and its results, we discuss its implications for medical ethics. (shrink)

One of the currently most discussed themes in the philosophy of action is whether there is some kind of collective intention that explains what groups do independent of what the indi-viduals who make up the group intend and do. One of the main obstacles to solve this prob-lem is that on the one hand collective intentionality is no simple summation, aggregate, or dis-tributive pattern of individual intentionality (the Irreducibility Claim), while on the other hand collective intentionality is in the heads (...) of the participating individuals, so to speak, and so it is owned by each of the separate individuals who make up the group (the Individual Ownership Claim). The claims are contradictory and until now no satisfactory solution how to reconcile them has been found. In this article I argue that the constitution view, like the one developed by Lynne R. Baker, can provide a way to sidestep the contradiction. Just as a statue as such is constituted by the marble it is made of but has characteristics that are different from the mar-ble (a statue has a head and legs, while the marble hasn’t; while the marble is stony and the statue as such isn’t), I argue that a group is constituted by its members and that a group on the one hand and its members on the other hand have different characteristics. This is possible be-cause group and members are on different levels. Then there is no longer a contradiction be-tween the Irreducibility Claim and the Individual Ownership Claim, for the former claim con-cerns the group level and the latter claim concerns the level of the group members. This ex-plains that a group can have intentions that are no simple summation, aggregate, or distributive patterns of the intentions of its members and that group intentions can be different from if not contradictory to what the individual members taken together intend. (shrink)

Margulis’ evolutionary theory entails a revision of certain core concepts of traditional biology. One of these changes is related to the hot debate about units of selection. This paper considers Margulis’ proposal as a new research tradition (RT) and evaluates its consequences to the mentioned issue. Three ideas are suggested here: firstly, that her theory represents the revision of many classical biological concepts; secondly, that her position implies a reappraisal of many traditional issues in philosophy of biology; and thirdly, that (...) studying it from Lakatos and Laudan’s ideas about RT allows us to enlighten the richness of her theory. (shrink)

The theories of belief change developed within the AGM-tradition are not logics in the proper sense, but rather informal axiomatic theories of belief change. Instead of characterizing the models of belief and belief change in a formalized object language, the AGM-approach uses a natural language — ordinary mathematical English — to characterize the mathematical structures that are under study. Recently, however, various authors such as Johan van Benthem and Maarten de Rijke have suggested representing doxastic change within a formal logical (...) language: a dynamic modal logic. Inspired by these suggestions Krister Segerberg has developed a very general logical framework for reasoning about doxastic change: dynamic doxastic logic (DDL). This framework may be seen as an extension of standard Hintikka-style doxastic logic with dynamic operators representing various kinds of transformations of the agent's doxastic state. Basic DDL describes an agent that has opinions about the external world and an ability to change these opinions in the light of new information. Such an agent is non-introspective in the sense that he lacks opinions about his own belief states. Here we are going to discuss various possibilities for developing a dynamic doxastic logic for introspective agents: full DDL or DDL unlimited. The project of constructing such a logic is faced with difficulties due to the fact that the agent’s own doxastic state now becomes a part of the reality that he is trying to explore: when an introspective agent learns more about the world, then the reality he holds beliefs about undergoes a change. But then his introspective (higher-order) beliefs have to be adjusted accordingly. In the paper we shall consider various ways of solving this problem. (shrink)

Predication is a lingual relation. We have this relation when a term is said (λέγεται) of another term. This simple definition, however, is not Aristotle’s own definition. In fact, he does not define predication but attaches his almost in a new field used word κατηγορεῖσθαι to λέγεται. In a predication, something is said of another thing, or, more simply, we have ‘something of something’ (ἓν καθ᾿ ἑνὸς). (PsA. , A, 22, 83b17-18) Therefore, a relation in which two terms are posited (...) to each other in a way that one is said (predicated) of the other is a predication. The term of which the other term is said is called a subject (ὑποκειμένον) and the other, which is said about the subject, is called the predicate. Thus, in a predication the predicate is predicated of the subject; given that being predicated is almost as the same as being said. The relation between being said and being predicated is so close that ‘if something is said of a subject both its name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject.’ (Cat., 5, 2a19-26) This, however, is true only about the second genera and not the accidents. a) Nature of relation in predication What is Aristotle’s theory about the nature of the relation in a predication? How does he fundamentally understand this relation? Phil Corkum distinguishes between predication logic and traditional term logic and argues that the relation between subject and predicate in Aristotle is of the latter kind. While in predicate logic, subjects and predicates have distinct roles, they have the same role in traditional term logic. In predication logic, subjects refer, but predicates characterize. Thereupon, a sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. In traditional term logic, both subjects and predicates refer and a sentences expresses a truth if both name one and the same thing. He concludes that Aristotle ‘problematically conflates prediction and identity claims’ because while he thinks both subjects and predicates refer, he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and the predicate name one and the same thing. Based on this, Corkum believes that Aristotle’s core semantic is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution, which is a mereological interpretation: ‘All men are mortal’ is true just in case the mereological sum of humans is part of the mereological sum of mortals. b) Aristotle’s theory of predication: one or two theories? Frank Lewis finds an inconsistent gap between the theory of predication in the Categories and that in the later books of the Metaphysics VII, 6. So too Joan Kung, Terry Irwin, Daniel Graham. c) Distinction of ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ Owen enumerates the texts in which Aristotle’s distinction between ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ is asserted: OI. 11b38-12a17; To., 127b1-4; Cat. 1a20-b9; 2a11-14; 2a27-b6; 2b15-17; 3a7-32; 9b22-24 d) Predication in Aristotle and the standard ‘S is P’ Marie De Rijk Lambertus thinks that the ‘S is P’ pattern is misleading when it comes to express predication in Aristotle. In his view, ‘The Aristotelian procedure should be described in terms of appositively assigning an attribute (κατηγορούμενον) to a substrate (ὑποκείμενον), rather than ascribing a predicate to a subject by means of a copula…. The comment should be considered an attribute which is said to fall to a substrate, without understanding this procedure in terms of sentence predication.’ e) Aristotle’s predication: bipartite or tripartite? It is a difficulty to make Aristotle’s theories of name-verb predication and tripartite predication consistent. The reason is that tripartite is not consistant with his name-verb structure based on which he says that the predicate term is the ‘verb.’ (20a31; 20b1-2; 16a13-5) The problem is that in a tripartite form like ‘Socrates is white’ we cannot take ‘is white’ as the verb because, based on Aristotle himself, no part of a verb can be significant itself. (16b6-7) However, his assertions about the equivalences between the two structures (OI. 12, 21b9-10; PrA. 51b13-16; Met., 1017b22-30) must mean that they are not inconsistent in his own view. Thus, as Allen Bāck points, ‘Aristotle seems to think that he has a single, consistent theory.’ The sense of saying or speaking as the root sense of rhema makes the relation between predication (saying something of something) and verb more interesting. The use of rhema in the sense of a long expression approves this. In Plato’s work (399ac) where Socrates claims that the name anthropos derives from anthron ha opopen (‘he who examines what he has seen’) we have an onoma from, or in place of, a rhema. 1) Subject The subject (ὑποκειμένον) is that of which another term is said or predicated. Aristotle’s own definition is of a much more philosophical value: ‘By subject I mean that which is expressed by an affirmative term (λέγω δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ κάταφάσει δηλούμενον).’ (Met., K, 1067b18) Throughout Aristotle’s work, three kinds of subjects can be found: possible, prime and absolute subject. a) Possible subject Those things that can take the position of a subject in a predication we call possible subjects, no matter they can or cannot take the position of predicate in any predication. All terms except the ultimate predicates are possible subjects because they can take the position of subject. b) Prime subject Those that in any predication can only take the position of a subject and not the position of a predicate are prime subjects. (Cat., 5, 3a36-b2; Met., Z, 1028b36-1029a1) This is the truest sense of subject and belongs only to substances. (Met., Z, 1029a1-2) In fact, ‘that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated’ is a substance. (Met., Z, 1029a7-9) In Categories, besides primary substances (Cat., 2, 1b3-6), individual qualities are also said not to be able to be said of anything else. (Cat., 2, 1a23-29) Aristotle’s examples are a certain ‘knowledge-of-grammar’ (τὶς γράμματικὴ) and ‘an individual white’ (τὸ τὶ λευκὸν). Thus, although substances are indeed in the truest sense individuals and, thereby, in the truest sense primary subjects, other individuals can take the position of subject as well. c) Absolute subject While substances are prime subjects of all other things, there is still something of which substances can be predicated and this predication is not an accidental predication: matter. (Met., Z, 1029a21-24) This predication is, indeed, the predication of a ‘form or this’ on matter and material substance. (Met., Θ, 1049a34-36) The only thing that is absolutely a subject, therefore, and can be a predicate is prime matter (πρώτη ὓλη). (Met., Θ, 1049a24-27) d) Subject and substance The most important thing in being a substance is being a subject: ‘It is because the primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them, that they are called substances most of all.’ (Cat., 5, 2b15-17) And what is nearer to this position is more a substance as a species is more a substance than a genus.’ (Cat., 5, 2b7-8) e) Primary versus accidental subject A subject is a primary subject in a predication when the predicate is predicated of it as itself. In such a case, the subject is the subject of the predicate qua itself and not qua something else. A subject, on the one hand, is an accidental subject when it is not the primary subject of the predicate that is predicated on it. It means that a subject is an accidental subject when the predicate is predicated of it not qua itself but qua something else. An accidental subject is, therefore, anything other than a substance. 2) Predicate as universal It is evident from our discussion of kinds of subjects that except matter, primary substances (if we ignore both accidental predication and cases of absolute subjects) and other individuals, everything else can take the position of a predicate. Since primary substances are individuals, it results that everything except matter and individuals are capable to take the position of predicate. The immediate consequence of this is that the predicate must be a universal. When individuals cannot take the position of predicate, this position cannot be taken by any particular. Therefore, only universals can be predicated of others. Moreover, albeit universals can be a simple subject (for another universal), they are not prime subjects. The closeness of universal and predicate is to the extent that Aristotle differentiates universal from subject. (Met., Θ, 1049a27-30) 3) Categories or classes of predicates Aristotle distinguishes ten highest classes into one of which each predicate must necessarily fall: substance (or what a thing is), quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, activity and passivity. (Cat., 4, 1b25-27; To., I, 9, 103b20- ; PsA., A, 22, 83b13-23) The substance counted among predicates must refer to secondary and not primary substances not only because Aristotle insists that primary substances cannot be predicated but also from his own examples of the category of substance: man and animal. (To., I, 9, 103b25) However, if a predicate be asserted of itself or its genus be asserted of it, the predicate signifies substance or what is; but if ‘one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind,’ it signifies one of the other nines. (To., I, 9, 103b30) These categories are so comprehensive that no predicate can remain outside them so that even non-being has as many senses as categories. (Met., M, 1089a26-30) a) That whether Aristotle’s categories are merely linguistic or fundamentally ontological is a so much controversial dispute. Some like G. E. R. Lloyd believe that ‘categories are primarily intended as a classification of reality … rather than of the signifying terms themselves.’ b) Although Aristotle’s categories have been historically regarded as a classification of predications, there are some recent commentators like Jonathan Barnes that think it is classifying predicates and not predications. 4) Kinds of predicates In his introduction of Categories, as J. W. Thorp truly points out , Aristotle distinguishes between the category of substance and the other categories using μὲν ... δὲ construction. This construction illustrates that beside tenfold classification of categories, there is an even more crucial differentiation between two kinds of predicates: substance or what is on the one hand and the other nine ones on the other hand: the distinction between what is predicated of the subject as what it is and what is predicated of it as an accident. Therefore, we have three kinds of classification - a twofold, a fourfold and a tenfold-complicatedly classifying the same thing, viz. the predicate. Predicates can be divided also to four kinds: property, definition, genus and accident. (To., I, 4, 101b11-20) A property is that predicate that is convertible with its subject and does not signify its essence. A definition is that predicate that is convertible with its subject and signifies its essence. It is a genus if it is not predicated convertibly and is contained in the definition of its subject. And it is an accident if it is neither convertible nor contained in the definition of its subject. (To., I, 8, ^103b3) All of these four kinds are among categories. (To., I, 9, 103b20) It seems that there might be some kind of relation between the twofold and the fourfold distinction: whereas genus and definition are predicated as what it is, accidents are not so predicated. There seems to be some rules that determine to each of these four kinds each predicate belongs. At To., IV, 123b30ff. Aristotle asserts: ‘If B has a contrary and A does not, then B does not belong to A as its genus.’ There is a dispute around per se accidents (τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα) (Topics., 102a18) whether they must be regarded as either of the four kinds or as a fifth kind. Barnes (1970) argued that they ‘do not fit at all neatly into the fourfold classification.’ He argues that based on the definition of accidents at A, 5, 102b4-5, they must be accidents but based on another definition, A, 5, 102b6-7, they cannot be accidents. He also defends the view that they are not properties. Barnes concludes: ‘This shows that the two definitions are not equivalent, and hence that the ‘predicables’ are not well-defined.’ Demetris J. Hadgopoulos defends the view that the two definitions of accidents are equivalent and per se accidents are properties. 5) Five types of predications We have five kinds of predications based on our division of subjects and our discussion of predicates: simple, primary (itself divided to substantial and accident), accidental (itself divided to primary and secondary), aoincidental and absolute predication. a) Simple predication. This is a predication in which a universal is predicated of either a particular or a universal subject. This sense of predication includes all other senses except the first kind of accidental predication. b) Primary predication. This is a predication in which a universal is predicated of a primary subject, namely a substance. A primary predication is of two kinds: i) Substantial predication. A primary predication in which the predicate is part of, or is included in, the definition of the subject. The universal that is the predicate here is the definition or the genus or the species or the diferentia of the subject. It is this predication that Aristotle calls a unity: ‘A statement may be called a unity … because it exhibits a single predicate as inhering not accidentally in a single subject.’ (PsA., B, 10, 93b35-37) It is only substantial predicates that can be predicated of each other: ‘Predicates which are not substantial are not predicated of one another.’ (PsA., A, 22, 83b18-19) Aristotle defines a substantial predication also in another way. A predication in which a higher genus is predicated on a lower genus, species, a substance or an individual, (or a species is predicated on an individual) is a substantial predication. Therefore, a substantial predication is a predication in a series that has individuals on one of its ends and a general category on its other end. In fact, only substantial predicates can be predicated of one another. (PsA., A, 22, 83b17-19) This series cannot be an infinite series because otherwise not only substances would not be definable but also a genus would be equal to one of its own species. (PsA., A, 22, 83b7-10) -/- ii) Accident predication. A primary predication in which the predicate is not part of, or is not included in, the definition of its subject. The universal that is the predicate here is the property or the accident of the subject. c) Accidental predication. This is a predication in which the subject is not a primary subject and its predicate is a substance. This predication is of two kinds: i) Primary accidental predication. This is a predication in which an accident is predicated of substance. Such a predication can go ad infinitum, which is inferable from Aristotle’s assertion that the secondary accidental predication cannot go ad infinitum. ii) Secondary accidental predication. It is a predication in which an accident is predicated of another accident. Such a predication, Aristotle asserts, cannot go ad infinitum because even more than two accidents cannot be combined. Now what is the meaning of Aristotle’s assertion that we cannot continue this ad infinitum? Does it mean that we cannot continue the predication ‘The musician is white’ and say ‘The white is Athenian?’ But why not? Or maybe he means that by adding any predication, we are still in a condition of predicating two accidents of a substance on each other. -/- As primary subjects, substances can also take the position of predicate though not essentially but accidentally. In propositions like ‘the white is a log’ or ‘That big thing is a log’ we observe substance taking the position of predicate but this is only accidentally: ‘When I affirm ‘the white is a log,’ I mean that something which happens to be white is a log- not that white is the subject in which log inheres (οὐχ ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ ξύλῳ τὸ λευκόν ἐστι), for it was not qua white or qua a species of white that the white (thing) came to be a log (οὔτε λευκὸν ὄν οὔθ᾿ ὃπερ λευκόν τι ἐγἐνετο ξύλον), and the white (thing) is consequently not a log except incidentally.’ (PsA., 22, 83a3-9) Aristotle compares this accidental use of substance in the position of predicate with the substantial use of it in the place of a subject: ‘On the other hand, when I affirm ‘the log is white,’ I do not mean that something else, which happens to be a log, is white (οὐχ ὃτι ἓτερόν τί ἐστι λευκόν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ συμβέβηκε ξύλῳ εἶναι), (as I should if I said ‘the musician is white,’ which would mean ‘The man who happens also to be a musician is white’); on the contrary, log is here the subject- the subject which actually came to be white, and did so qua wood or qua a species of wood and qua nothing else.’ (PsA., 22, 83a8-14) Aristotle asks us not to call propositions like ‘The white is a log’ a predication at all or at least call them accidental predication instead of simple (ἁπλως) predication. (PsA., A, 22, 83a14-17) An accidental predication, in which we have a substance in the place of predicate, is different from an essential predication in that while the subject of an accidental predication is said to be the predicate not by itself but as something different with which it coincides, the subject of an essential predicate is said to be the predicate by itself and not because it is something else: ‘Since there are attributes which are predicated of a subject essentially and not accidentally- not, that is, in the sense in which we say ‘That white (thing) is a man,’ which is not the same mode of predication as when we say ‘The man is white’: the man is white not because he is something else but because he is man, but the white is man because ‘being white’ coincides with ‘humanity’ within one subject. Therefore, there are terms such as are essentially subjects of predicates. (PsA., A, 19, 81a24-29) This capability of ‘non-essentially and only accidentally’ being a subject does belong, in fact, to all sensible things. (PsA., A, 27a32-36) d) Coincidental predication. this is a predication in which none of the subject and predicate are a substance or an individual. In this predication, one of the accidents of a substance or individual is predicated of one of the other accidentals of the same substance or individual. For example, when it is said that ‘The white is musical,’ there is an individual, say Socrates, for which both of white and musical are accidents. e) Absolute predication. This is a predication in which a form or a substance is predicated of a matter or a material substance. Some commentators like Loux and Lewis regarded this predication as close to accident predication, both based on inherence. As R.M. Dancy points out, these predications make Aristotle’s theory of predication immanentist: not only accident predications are explained by the immanence of accidents in substances, some of the substantial predications, which were not explained in Categories, are also explained by the immanence of form in matter. It is interesting that in this kind of predication, it is the predicate and not the subject, which is in the strictest sense substance. As the central books of Metaphysics claim, the form is the substance. Thus, in this predication, substance gets away from the sense of ὑποκείμενον. Corkum mentiones 68a19 as the only instance where Aristotle explicitly claims that a term may be predicated of itself, a passage that is, in Corkum’s view, problematic. 6) Demonstrable predicates Those predicates are demonstrable that are so related to their subjects that there are other predicates prior to them predicable of their subjects (ἔτι δ᾿ ἄλλος, εἰ ὧν πρότερα ἄττα κατηγορεῖται). (PsA., A, 22, 83b32-34) 7) Series of predications Since it is possible for a predicate to be itself the subject of another predication, we can have a series of predications in which the predicate of a predication is the subject of the next predication. This series has the following features: a) It has a limit (in number) (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) on the side of subjects: there are subjects that cannot themselves be predicated (PsA., A, 27, 43a39-41), which are, as we noted, prime subjects: particulars, i.e. prime substances and other individuals. (PsA., A, 19-22) Aristotle calls them ultimate (ὓστατον). (PsA., 21, 82a36-b1) b) It has a limit (in number of kinds) (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) also on the side of predicates: there must be predicates that cannot be subjects. (PsA., A, 19-22; PsA., A, 27, 43a36-39) Aristotle calls them primary (πρῶτον). (PsA., A, 21, 82b1-4) These are the highest categories or the highest genera of categories. (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) c) The series has an escalating shape from mere subjects at its downside to mere predicates at its upside. It is Aristotle himself whos uses the words up and down in this sense. (e.g. PsA., A, 22, 83b2-3) d) The predications that lie between lowest and highest ones must be finite in number. (PsA., A, 19-22 especially: 20, 82a21-35) These have subjects and predicates, each capable of both of the roles of being subject and being predicated. A result of this fitness is that neither demonstration can go to infinity nor everything is demonstrable, the two points Aristotle always insist on. e) The upward side includes the more universal ones and the downward the more particular ones. (PsA., 20, 82a21-23) f) It follows from the above features that ‘neither the ascending nor the descending series of predications … are infinite.’ (PsA., A, 22, 83b24-25) g) Reciprocation and convertibility. Except in case of terms (i.e. subjects and predicates) that are at each of the ends of series of predications, namely ultimates and primaries, it is possible to reciprocate (ἀντιστρέφειν) terms and convert the predication. (PsA., A, 19, 82a15-20) h) Antipredication. Antipredication means that in a predication (S is P), the subject becomes the predicate of its predicate (P is S) in the same category its predicate was predicated on it. For example, if P is in the category of quality, antipredication means that S be predicated of P in the category of quality. In other words, P is a quality of S and S is a quality of P. Aristotle rejects this. (PsA., A, 22, 83a36-b3) i) Self-predication versus other-predication. Aristotle distinguishes between a predication in which a term is said of itself and a predication in which a term is said of another. (Phy., Δ, 2, 209a31-33) j) Predicablity (Cat., 5, 3a36-b2): 1) Primary substances and individuals are not predicable. 2) Secondary substances are of two kinds: genus and species i) Genus is predicable able both of the species and of the individuals. ii) Species is predicable of the individual. 3) Differentiae are predicable both of the species and of the individuals. 8) Predication as classification a) Richard Patterson believes that Aristotle’s so repeated construction using hoper (estin A hoper B) in Topics (120a23 sq., 122b19, 26sq., 123a, 124a18, 125a29, 126a21, 128a35. Also in Posterior Analytics (83a24-30) (Brunschwig’s list. ‘expresses the fact that A is a kind of B (esti A B tis), that A is a species of the genus B.’ 9) Universal predication Aristotle defines universal predication (κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι) as such: ‘wherever no instance of the subject (τῶν τοῦ ὑποκειμέμνου) can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted.’ (PrA., A, 24b27-29) In this predication, the subject is included in another as in a whole (ἐν ὃλῳ εἶναι) and the predicate is predicated of all of the subject (κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι). (PrA., A, 24b26-27) Attach another discussion we had about ἐν ὃλῳ here. 10) Quantity of predication A predication, truly stated, has a quantity, which is the number of objects under the name of the subject of which the predicate is predicated. The quantity of subject can be stated in four ways: a. Indefinite: when the predicate belongs or does not belong to the subject without any mark to show to haw many of the particulars under the name of the subject it does or does not belong. E.g. ‘Man is white’; ‘Man is not white.’ (PrA., A, 24a20; OI., I, 7, 17b8-12) b. Universal quantity: When the predicate belongs to all or none of the subject. E.g. ‘Every man is animal’; ‘No man is animal.’ (PrA., A, 24a18-19; OI., I, 7, 17b5-6) The contrary of a predication of a universal quality is a predication of a universal quality. E.g. the contrary of ‘Every man is white’ is ‘No man is white.’ (OI., I, 7, 17b20-23) c. Particular quantity: When the predicate belongs (or does not belong) to some of the subject. E.g. ‘Some men are white’; ‘Some men are not white.’ (PrA., A, 24a19-20) d. Single quantity: when the subject is a proper name of only one object. E.g. ‘Socrates is white’; ‘Socrates is not white.’ The contrary of this predication is of a single quantity: ‘Socrates is not white.’ (OI., I, 7, 17b38-18a4) 11) Convertibility of predication. Some predications are convertible, that is, it is possible to change the place of subject and predicate in a true proposition so that the converted proposition remains true. This is supposed to mean that given the truth of a predication, the truth of the converted predication is inferable. The convert form of a predication depends on its quantity. a. Indefinite quantity: This predication has no strictly true convert because its quantity is not stated. b. Universal quantity: It can be converted in two ways: i) A negative universal can be converted to a negative universal in which the terms are changed. E.g. ‘No pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘No good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a5-8 and a14-19) ii) An affirmative universal can be converted to an affirmative particular in which the terms are changed. E.g. ‘Every pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘Some good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a7-9) c. Particular quantity: If it is negative, it cannot be converted but if it is affirmative, it can be converted to an affirmative predication with particular quantity. E.g. ‘Some pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘Some good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a10-13 and a20-24) d. Single quantity: It cannot be converted. 12) Characteristics of relations between subject and predicate 1. A predicate is of a wider range than its subject. It is based on this fact that Aristotle: a) Prevents individuals to be predicate because there is nothing of which an individual be of a wider range. In other words, it is due to the fact that since an individual is only ‘one particular’ thing and, thus, cannot be of a wider extent than anything that Aristotle prevents them of being a predicate. Matthews, however, thinks we cannot use Socrates, a substance and an individual, in the place of predicate and say it of Socrates because ‘Socrates does not classify Socrates: it names him.’ b) Prevents differentia, species and things under species to be predicated of genus. (To., Z, 6, 144a27-) c) Prevents the species and the things under it to be predicated of the differentia. (To., Z, 6, 144b1-4) d) Also about the effect because it is wider than its subject. (PsA., B, 17, 99a) e) Each attribute is wider than every individual it is predicated on, though several attributes, collectively considered, might not be wider but exactly the substance of a thing. (PsA., B, 13, 96a32-b1) 2. The predicate of a predicate of a subject will be predicated of the subject too: ‘whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject too.’ (Cat., 3, 1b10-15) In fact, it is due to its predication of the subject that it is predicated of its predicate. (Cat., 5, 2a36-b1) Moreover, what is not predicated of the predicate of a subject cannot be predicated of it as well. (PrA., A, 27, 43b22-27) Thus, what, for example, is not predicated of animal, cannot be predicated of man. 3. The predicate of a subject can be predicated of its predicates as well. (Cat., 5, 3a1-6) For example, you call the individual man grammatical and, thence, you call both a man and an animal grammatical. Nonetheless, the predicate of a subject belongs to it more properly than to its higher predicates. (PrA., A, 27, 43a27-32) 4. It is only the subject that can be distributed and not the predicate. (PrA., A, 27, 43b16-22; OI, I, 7, 17b12-16) Therefore, we can say e.g. ‘Every man is animal’ but we cannot say ‘Every man is every animal.’ 5. It is the reason of the relation between subjects and predicates, that is the reason of predication, which is the subject of inquiry. (Met., Z, 1041a20-24) In other words, since it is a meaningless inquiry to ask why a thing is itself (Met., Z, 1041a14-15), the only remaining meaningful inquiry is to ask why something is something else, i.e. to ask about the reason of predication. 6. A subject cannot categorize its predicate in the same category in which it is categorized by it. If e.g. A is a quality of B, B cannot be a quality of A. Therefore, there is no reciprocation in the same category. (PsA., A, 22, 83a36-39) 13) Characteristics of series of predications 1. A series of secondary accidental predication cannot go ad infinitum for not even more than two terms can be comnbined. For an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless it be because both are accidents of the same subject. (Met., Γ, 1007b1-4) 2. Infinite series cannot be traversed in thought. (PsA., A, 22, 83b6-7) 3. The predications of genera on each other must be ended and cannot go to infinity because otherwise not only substances would not be definable but also a genus would be equal to one of its own species. (PsA., A, 22, 83b7-10) Therefore, a series of predication of genera on each other must be limited on both sides. There must be an upward limit in general categories as well as a downward limit in individual because they cannot be predicated of others. Whatever lies between these limits can both be predicated of others and others be predicated of them. (PrA., A, 27, 43a36-43) 4. The order of predicates matters: it makes a difference whether the series be ABC or BAC. (PsA., B, 13, 96b25-32) . (shrink)

For Aristotle, a verb (ῥῆμα) is that which a) besides a proper meaning b) carry with it the notion of time; c) its parts do not significate separately and d) is a sign of something said of something else (OI ., 2, 16b6-8). This comprehensive definition distinguishes verbs from both nouns (since they do not carry the notion of time with themselves) and sentences or co-positings of words (since they have parts with independent meanings). Based on this definition, a verb (...) signifies three things: i) A main or proper meaning which is the meaning of the verb, e.g. running or sleeping; ii) time and iii) co-positing (or positing away). Although it is not asserted that one part is responsible for prossignification of time, its responsibility is given to co-positing-is. This might seem to be in contradiction with (c). However, it seems that (c) cannot include prossignifications of time and co-positing. What Aristotle means in (c) is just that parts of a verb cannot separately signify a meaning. Therefore, it is better to distinguish between signification, which is about meaning and prossignification, which is generally about anything but meaning. Hence, while the parts of the verb cannot have separate signification, they can have separate prossignification. Aristotle distinguishes between different kinds of verbs: 1) Definite verbs: those verbs that have definite nouns as their verb-name. 2) Indefinite verbs: those verbs that do not have definite nouns as their verb-name (OI., I, 3, 16b12-14; 10, 19b10-11). Aristotle’s examples of an indefinite verb are ‘is not-healthy’ and ‘is not-ill’. 3) Tenses of verbs: ‘was healthy’ and ‘will be healthy’ are tenses of the verb ‘is healthy’ because a verb indicates only the present time (OI., I, 3, 16b16-18). For Aristotle, almost all verbs either are composed of or can be analyzed to parts. An example of the former is ‘is healthy’ and of the latter is ‘runs,’ which can be analyzed to two parts: ‘is running.’ (OI., I, 10, 20a3-5; II, 12, 21b5-8). Thus, for him a verb either includes or can be analyzed to two parts: a part that includes the meaning and is, or is shown, by a name we call ‘verb-name’ (a), and a part that includes the co-positing of that meaning with the subject of the verb, which is or is shown by ‘is’, which we call ‘co-positing-is’ (d). The verb ‘runs’, for example, can be analyzed to a verb-name, ‘running’ and a co-positing-is (Note: Aristotle distinguishes between the verb ‘is’ in the sense of ‘exists’ and the co-positing ‘is’. Whereas in the former ‘is’ is a verb, having a signification of its own, which is ‘existing’, besides signifying time (OI., I, 10, 19b12-19), the ‘is’ in the latter is not a verb (Aristotle calls it ‘incidental’ is (OI., II, 11, 21a25-28) and is not sure whether to call it a verb or a noun (OI., I, 10, 19b22-24)) because it does not signify existing and, thus, need something else to be added. This something else is the meaning we are discussing. Therefore, it is only after the addition of the meaning to this ‘is’ that we have a verb. This is, I believe, the sense of the so much controversial text of OI, I, 3, 16b22-25: ‘For being and not being signify the existence of a thing not τὸ ὄν εἴπῃς αὐτὸ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸ ψιλόν. For it does not indicate anything but prossignifies some co-positing (σύνθεσίν). Aristotle’s words at 16b24 about co-positing-is that it ‘prossignifies some co-positing’ (προσσημαίνει δὲ σύνθεσίν τινα) is an explicit evidence that she cannot be right.) and is not a concept apart from the things co-posited (συγκειμένων).’ This text, however, is so controversial. Originating from Ammonius and Boethius after him, who used the verb ‘copular’ for ‘est’ and Abelard, some commentators like Weidemann, Oehler, Francisco Ademollo take ‘is’ as having a copulative function. Allen Bāck notes that Aristotle does not separate off ‘is’ from other verbs as a mere copula but takes it ‘as the basic, paradigmatic form of the verb.’ He believes that in his interpretation of Aristotle (in: OI., 55, 19-24) Ammonius also took it as the paradigm for all verbs. Francisco Ademollo criticizes the standard view of taking ‘is’ as copula here and is inclined to take it as essential. David Ross thinks that although Aristotle is aware of the distinction between the existential and the copulative is, he has as yet no very clear idea of their relation. Although Jonathan Barnes agrees that the copula is surely present in de Interpretation, he thinks that at 16b22-25 Aristotle ought to be talking of existential εἶναι. Marie De Rijk Lambartus believes that there is no copula in Aristotle’s philosophical analysis of the elementary sentences and it is a mere corpus alienum in Aristotle’s semantics. Allan Bȃck believes that the copulative theory is not Aristotle’s and ‘may have come to dominate as a result of the neoPlatonizing interpretations of Aristotle’s works by Proclus, Ammonius and Boethius, which is the sign of the relation of running with a subject, e.g. Socrates in ‘Socrates runs’. Nonetheless, none of these parts significate separately. This is supposed to mean that a verb is a single signification. However, it is evident that each of the parts can signify if we use them in a different context as both of ‘running’ and ‘is’ in ‘runs’ or both of ‘is’ and ‘healthy’ in ‘is healthy’ can do. It might seem now that the first mentioned definition of verb might be contradictory. While Aristotle asserts that the parts of verb do not signify separately (d), he considers two other significations for a verb: the signification of time and relation. As it is obvious, both of these significations are done by one part of the verb, that is the co-positing-is. Therefore, in a verb e.g. ‘is healthy’ we have three significations: the significations of meaning, time and co-positing. Aristotle uses prossignification both for time (προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, OI., 2, 16b4) and co-positing (προσσημαίνει δἑ σύνθεσὶν τινα, OI, I, 3, 16b23-24). Since the copula part of a verb has no signification and does not form any conception, a verb is indeed its verb-name. Thus we see Aristotle saying that ‘verbs are in and by themselves names and signify something’ and like names, he adds, they arrest the hearer’s mind and fix his attention (OI., I, 3, 16b19-22). We can conclude then that verbs are names said of something else and carrying time. In other words, verbs are words that though have one single signification, as names have, they also have two other prossignifications: time and relation. (shrink)

This paper is the written version of my contribution to the International Conference «30 years Logica modernorum» held in Amsterdam in November 1997 in honor of the late prof. Lambertus M. de Rijk. Research on Oresme’s modi rerum theory was in the first stage, while now we can read the critical edition of Oresme’s Physics commentary, where modi are introduced and widely used. In this paper I shall consider Oresme’s polemical use of modi rerum, trying to set it in (...) the larger context of both his ontology and his epistemology. Oresme’s challenge to either a realist or terminist ontology by means of modi rerum conceals probably an attack to William of Ockham; Oresme refers explicitly to Ockham concerning exclusive propositions, but I think that on many other occasions the polemical target of Oresme’s criticism can be reasonably identified in William of Ockham or in some unnamed followers of the Venerabilis Inceptor. Some hints are reserved also to the possible sources of Oresme’s modi rerum. (shrink)

Boethius identifies God both with esse ipsum and esse suum. This paper explains Boethius's general semantic use of "esse" and the application of this use to God. It questions the helpfulness of attributing to Boethius "existence" words and argues for a more robust role in Boethius’s thought for Hilary of Poitiers’s and Augustine’s exegeses of Exodus 3:14-15 than has been acknowledged in recent scholarship.

Lynne Baker’s case for the incompatibility of naturalism with the first-person perspective raises a range of questions about the relationship between naturalism and the various properties involved in first-person perspectives. After arguing that non-qualitative properties—most notably, haecceities like being Lynne Baker—are ineliminably tied to first-person perspectives, this paper considers whether naturalism and non-qualitative properties are, in fact, compatible. In doing so, the discussion focus on Shamik Dasupgta’s argument against individuals and, in turn, non-qualitative properties. Several strategies for undermining Dasgupta's argument (...) are considered, drawing on de re laws and haecceitistic possibilities. Finally, an analogy is drawn between naturalism and platonism regarding mathematical entities and naturalism's parallel commitment to individuals. I conclude that naturalists are obliged to posit non-qualitative properties. (shrink)

MARGARET LYNN SCHABAS (Toronto, 1954) is professor of philosophy at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver and served as the head of the Philosophy Department from 2004-2009. She has held professoriate positions at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and at York University, and has also taught as a visiting professor at Michigan State University, University of Colorado-Boulder, Harvard, CalTech, the Sorbonne, and the École Normale de Cachan. As the recipient of several fellowships, she has enjoyed visiting terms at Stanford, (...) Duke, MIT, Cambridge, the LSE, and the MPI-Berlin. In addition to her doctorate in the history and philosophy of science and technology (Toronto 1983), she holds a bachelor of science in music (oboe) and the philosophy of science (Indiana 1976), a master’s degree in the history and philosophy of science (Indiana 1977), and a master’s degree in economics (Michigan1985). -/- She has published four books and over forty articles or book chapters in science studies. Some of the journals in which her articles can be found are Isis, Monist, History of Political Economy, Public Affairs Quarterly, Daedaelus, Journal of Economic Perspectives, and Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Her first book, A world ruled by number (1990) examines the emergence of mathematical economics in the second half of the nineteenth century. Her second book, The natural origins of economics (2005), traces the transformation of economics from a natural to a social science. She also has two co-edited collections, Oeconomies in the age of Newton (2003), with Neil De Marchi, and David Hume’s political economy (2008), with Carl Wennerlind. She is currently writing a monograph on Hume’s economics, as well as articles on the history and philosophy of bioeconomics. She is currently president of the History of Economics Society. -/- EJPE interviewed Margaret Schabas at the University of British Columbia in March 2013. In this interview, she recounts her earliest foray into the history and philosophy of economics, the conceptual trade between economics and natural science, and her most recent undertaking: the history and philosophy of bioeconomics. (shrink)

Wat zou er veranderen in de wijze waarop het onderwijs gewend is professionals op te leiden als docenten erkennen dat de toekomst onkenbaar en onzeker is? In plaats van de onzekerheid te problematiseren – onzekerheid is een probleem waarmee de professional heeft te dealen – vraag ik mij af of het ook mogelijk is om onzekerheid als een rijke bron van mogelijkheden te zien. Ik maak hierbij gebruik van het onderscheid dat de Duitse filosoof Friedrich Nietzsche maakt tussen het streven (...) naar orde en harmonie – het apollinische – en de kracht die de orde en harmonie juist teniet probeert te doen – het dionysische. Wanneer docenten in het beroepsonderwijs Nietzsches pleidooi om meer ruimte aan het dionysische te geven ter harte nemen en zelf bereid zijn om hun zekerheden op het spel te zetten, kunnen zij de professionals-in-wording beter voorbereiden op een onzekere (beroeps)wereld. Ze kunnen hen leren dat onzekerheid juist mogelijkheden biedt om tot nieuwe vormen van handelen en denken te komen. (shrink)

Resident microbiota do not just shape host immunity, they can also contribute to host protection against pathogens and infectious diseases. Previous reviews of the protective roles of the microbiota have focused exclusively on colonization resistance localized within a microenvironment. This review shows that the protection against pathogens also involves the mitigation of pathogenic impact without eliminating the pathogens (i.e., “disease tolerance”) and the containment of microorganisms to prevent pathogenic spread. Protective microorganisms can have an impact beyond their niche, interfering with (...) the entry, establishment, growth, and spread of pathogenic microorganisms. More fundamentally, we propose a series of conceptual clarifications in support of the idea of a “co-immunity,” where an organism is protected by both its own immune system and components of its microbiota. -/- . (shrink)

Value Sensitive Design (VSD) is an established method for integrating values into technical design. It has been applied to different technologies and, more recently, to artificial intelligence (AI). We argue that AI poses a number of challenges specific to VSD that require a somewhat modified VSD approach. Machine learning (ML), in particular, poses two challenges. First, humans may not understand how an AI system learns certain things. This requires paying attention to values such as transparency, explicability, and accountability. Second, ML (...) may lead to AI systems adapting in ways that ‘disembody’ the values embedded in them. To address this, we propose a threefold modified VSD approach: 1) integrating a known set of VSD principles (AI4SG) as design norms from which more specific design requirements can be derived; 2) distinguishing between values that are promoted and respected by the design to ensure outcomes that not only do no harm but also contribute to good; and 3) extending the VSD process to encompass the whole life cycle of an AI technology in order to monitor unintended value consequences and redesign as needed. We illustrate our VSD for AI approach with an example use case of a SARS-CoV-2 contact tracing app. (shrink)

Derogatory terms (racist, sexist, ethnic, and homophobic epithets) are bully words with ontological force: they serve to establish and maintain a corrupt social system fuelled by distinctions designed to justify relations of dominance and subordination. No wonder they have occasioned public outcry and legal response. The inferential role analysis developed here helps move us away from thinking of the harms as being located in connotation (representing mere speaker bias) or denotation (holding that the terms fail to refer due to inaccurate (...) descriptive content). The issue is not bad attitudes or referential misfires. An inferential role semantic analysis of derogatory terms shows exactly what is at stake between those who argue that the terms should be eliminated (Absolutists) and those who claim they can be successfully rehabilitated (Reclaimers). The Reclaimer maintains, and the Absolutist denies, that certain contexts can detach the derogatory force from deeply derogatory terms. The article looks at these claims with respect to ‘nigger’ and ‘dyke,’ setting out the inferential role of each term and examining detachability potential. Explaining detachability in terms of linguistic commitments, this article also addresses the issue of whether such terms count as political discourse, and examines the implications of that issue. (shrink)

This chapter proposed a novel design methodology called Value-Sensitive Design and its potential application to the field of artificial intelligence research and design. It discusses the imperatives in adopting a design philosophy that embeds values into the design of artificial agents at the early stages of AI development. Because of the high risk stakes in the unmitigated design of artificial agents, this chapter proposes that even though VSD may turn out to be a less-than-optimal design methodology, it currently provides a (...) framework that has the potential to embed stakeholder values and incorporate current design methods. The reader should begin to take away the importance of a proactive design approach to intelligent agents. (shrink)

Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) are robotic weapons systems, primarily of value to the military, that could engage in offensive or defensive actions without human intervention. This paper assesses and engages the current arguments for and against the use of LAWs through the lens of achieving more ethical warfare. Specific interest is given particularly to ethical LAWs, which are artificially intelligent weapons systems that make decisions within the bounds of their ethics-based code. To ensure that a wide, but not exhaustive, survey (...) of the implications of employing such ethical devices to replace humans in warfare is taken into account, this paper will engage on matters related to current scholarship on the rejection or acceptance of LAWs—including contemporary technological shortcomings of LAWs to differentiate between targets and the behavioral and psychological volatility of humans—and current and proposed regulatory infrastructures for developing and using such devices. After careful consideration of these factors, this paper will conclude that only ethical LAWs should be used to replace human involvement in war, and, by extension of their consistent abilities, should remove humans from war until a more formidable discovery is made in conducting ethical warfare. (shrink)

This essay takes a first step in comparative ethics by looking to Aristotle and the Aztec's conceptions of the good life. It argues that the Aztec conception of a rooted life, neltiliztli, functions for ethical purposes in a way that is like Aristotle's eudaimonia. To develop this claim, it not only shows just in what their conceptions of the good consist, but also in what way the Aztecs conceived of the virtues (in qualli, in yectli).

Mit Beiträgen von Gerhard Vollmer, Dirk Koppelberg, Stephen Stich, W. v. O. Quine, Ansgar Beckermann, Dirk Hartmann und Rainer Lange, Mircea Flonta, Geert Keil, Peter Simons, Andreas Kemmerling, Lynne R. Baker, Holm Tetens und Peter Janich.

A curious feature of Aztec philosophy is that the basic metaphysical question of the “Western” tradition cannot be formulated in their language, in Nahuatl. This did not, however, prevent the Aztecs from developing an account of 'reality', or whatever it is that might exist. The article is the first of its kind to compare the work of Aristotle on ousia (being) and the Aztecs on teotl and ometeotl. Through this analysis, it suggests that both of the Nahuatl terms are fundamental (...) for expressing the basic character of reality as process for the Aztecs. It also defends their notion as prima facia reasonable, despite its wide divergence from Aristotle's view. (shrink)

Brentano's philosophy of art, contained primarily in his book, Grundzuge der Ästhetik, is the result of an original theory of intrinsic value that was derived from Brentano's philosophical psychology. In his aesthetics, Brentano endeavored to find an objective ground for the value of aesthetic contemplation through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. The lack of attention Brentano's aesthetics has received is surprising, given that two of the many students Brentano influenced, Husserl (through the development of the (...) phenomenological movement) and Ehrenfels (through the development of Gestalt psychology) have had an extraordinary influence on twentieth century perceptions of art. In this paper I will attempt to redress some of this neglect by outlining Brentano's analysis of aesthetic intentions and the relationship his aesthetics bears to his overall philosophical system. (shrink)

Feminists have urged women to take semantic authority. This article explains what such authority is, how it depends upon community recognition, and how it differs from privilege and from authority as usually conceived under patriarchy. Understanding its natures and limits is an important part of attaining it. Understanding the role of community explains why separatism is the logical conclusion of this project, and why separatism is valuable even to those who do not separate.

Making sense of MacKinnon’s claim that pornography silences women requires attention to the discursive and interpretive frameworks that pornography establishes and promotes. Treating pornography as a form of hate speech is promising, but also limited. A close examination of a legal case, in which pornographic images were used to sexually harass, focuses on the hate speech analogy while illustrating the broad and lasting impact of such depictions when targeted at an individual. Applying the distinction between Absolutist and Reclaimer approaches to (...) hate speech and derogatory terms, the article concludes with a discussion of the possibility of creative development of discursive practices within a context that undermines the semantic authority of members of certain groups. (shrink)

Este trabalho apresenta algumas considerações a respeito da Base Nacional Comum Curricular (BNCC), no referente às questões ligadas ao ensino da língua portuguesa no Brasil, à territorialidade e ao pertencimento racial, processos históricos, que envolvem, no campo da educação, a formação docente e a construção da cidadania dos educandos e das educandas nestes tempos de reafirmação do Estado democrático de direito e da vaga decolonial. Portanto, trata-se de uma abordagem política em termos do pensamento de Paulo Freire, patrono da educação (...) brasileira, que considerava político o ato de educar (FREIRE, 1980; 1983; 1989; 1996). É com base nesta perspectiva que a BNCC será abordada, mas sob o aporte teórico da análise pragmática do discurso, tributária da análise discursivo-desconstrutiva (cf. ARAÚJO, 2020). (shrink)

Derogatory terms (racist, sexist, ethnic epithets) have long played various roles and achieved diverse ends in works of art. Focusing on basic aspects of an aesthetic object or work, this article examines the interpretive relation between point of view and content, asking how aesthetic contextualization shapes the impact of such terms. Can context, particularly aesthetic contexts, detach the derogatory force from powerful epithets and racist and sexist images? What would it be about aesthetic contexts that would make this possible? The (...) article puts into aesthetic contexts both Absolutist and Reclaimer views about the power of derogatory terms, applying an inferential role semantics, developed for language, to both words and images. The Reclaimer’s position, that derogation is a matter of pragmatics, of use, emphasizes the context-sensitivity of the term, that is matters who says it, to whom, when, where, and why. Understanding derogatory terms used as hate speech helps to make this position clear. The Absolutist’s position, that no contextual variations can detach the derogation from these deeply derogatory terms, is developed here through attention to subordinating images in pornography. The article argues that art may be able to achieve the deviant interpretations that the Reclaimer needs to undermine the derogations while maintaining sensitivity and awareness of the history of oppression. (shrink)

Risk Management Strategies and Investment Behaviors are considered important factors in the investing activities of the retail investors. This study seeks to determine the relationship between Risk Management Strategies and Investment Behavior of Generation Z retail investors. The study is a correlational research and purposive sampling was used to select the respondents for this study. Cochran’s formula was utilized to determine the total sample size or total number of respondents. Spearman’s Rank-Order Correlation was employed to assess the significant relationship of (...) Risk Management Strategies and Investment Behaviors. Based on the results, it showed that risk management strategies have a significant relationship with one or more of the investment behaviors. Risk avoidance has a significant relationship with confirmation bias. Risk reduction has a significant relationship with all of the investment behaviors such as overconfidence, loss-aversion, recency bias, and confirmation bias. Risk transfer shows a significant relationship with only loss-aversion and confirmation bias. And lastly, risk acceptance also has a significant relationship with all of the investment behaviors. This study recommends exploring other types of behavioral biases under cognitive bias and emotional bias to determine their correlation with risk management strategies. Also, broadening the sample size, demographic scope, and geographic scope of the study can improve the generalizability of the study and provide a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between investment behavior and risk management strategies. The researchers also recommend to utilize interviews and focus group discussions to gain an in-depth understanding of the underlying values and attitudes concerning investment behavior. (shrink)

The right to a dignified death is largely overlooked by Brazilian law. This neglect of the end-of-life process and its ramifications is the focus of this study, which aims at an exploratory survey to identify pertinent aspects requiring development to ensure a dignified end-of-life experience. In total, 50 publications were examined with online and physical surveys of works published up to March 2023. They express concerns regarding ethical dilemmas in caring for individuals nearing the end of life, yet they do (...) not delve into existing mechanisms for safeguarding end-of-life dignity or identify areas that still lack standardization to ensure effective care. This study should contribute to the enhancement of critical perspectives on the issue of end-of-life experiences, considering current safeguards, the legal boundaries set by the State, and potential future strides toward advancing studies aimed at the practical update of the Brazilian legal system. (shrink)

One of the deepest assumptions of Judaism and its offspring, Christianity, is that there is an important difference between human persons and everything else that exists in Creation. We alone are made in God’s image. We alone are the stewards of the earth. It is said in Genesis that we have “dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps (...) upon the earth.” It is difficult to see how a traditional theist could deny the significance of the difference between human persons and the rest of Creation. We human persons are morally and ontologically special. (shrink)

This letter addresses the editorial decision to publish the article, “Research on group differences in intelligence: A defense of free inquiry” (Cofnas, 2020). Our letter points out several critical problems with Cofnas's article, which we believe should have either disqualified the manuscript upon submission or been addressed during the review process and resulted in substantial revisions.

This article explores the cognitive and epistemic dimensions of a harm-centered theory of evil, as set out in Card’s The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil. Examining testimony of both survivors and perpetrators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide helps to support, clarify, and extend Card’s view. Of particular concern are questions of recognizing evil as such, whether the demand to avoid evil sets too high a standard of control over oneself and one’s circumstances, and how to understand agency within evil (...) contexts. This article introduces the concept of ‘recognition harm’, which is an epistemic harm presupposed by and often constitutive of the kinds of intolerable harms that constitute evil, arguing that it is consistent with Card’s account. Finally, the article addresses to the application of the atrocity paradigm to chronic, enduring, systemic harms like sexism. (shrink)

The 20th Century is the starting point for the most ambitious attempts to extrapolate human life into artificial systems. Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics, Claude Shannon’s Information Theory, John von Neumann’s Cellular Automata, Universal Constructor to the Turing Test, Artificial Intelligence to Maturana and Varela’s Autopoietic Organization, all shared the goal of understanding in what sense humans resemble a machine. This scientific and technological movement has embraced all disciplines without exceptions, not only mathematics and physics but also biology, sociology, psychology, economics etc. (...) New terms were developed, such as “information”, “organization”, “entropy”, “communication”, “encryption”, “computation” and “algorithmics” to mention a few, all which had an enormous impact on artificial systems. Our work follows this historical track but with a reversed order of priorities. Instead of deducing a reduced group of human acts into an artificial environment, we deduce the human aspects of machines by extrapolating algorithmic methodologies into everyday life acts. The present informational theories were insufficiently powered to achieve this objective without developing a new theoretical approach. Hence, our research is directed towards an expansion of the current informational theories. (shrink)

O presente artigo almeja refletir sobre os pressupostos educacionais presentes na obra Sobre a Pedagogia, de Kant e A destinação do erudito, de Fichte. Quanto a Kant, buscar-se-á demonstrar a importância que o pensador confere a uma sólida formação na infância, que será refletida no adulto do futuro. No que se refere a Fichte, o pensador, partindo de pressupostos kantianos, reafirma a importância da construção de uma sociedade moral, na qual cada indivíduo tem uma vocação a ser exercida livremente e (...) que beneficiará a todos os demais. Em ambos os pensadores, pode-se perceber uma ênfase no estabelecimento da educação moral, com o objetivo de promover uma boa convivência em sociedade. A finalidade dessa educação é fazer com que os instintos se submetam à lei moral, que, em última instância, serve para permitir que o indivíduo conviva em harmonia com seus semelhantes. (shrink)

This study analyzes the relationship between foreign trade and economic growth in Myanmar over the period 1990-2014. It covers the annual data of GDP, Export and Import of Myanmar from 1980 to 2014. This study adopts two major methodological approaches – exploratory data analysis and descriptive analysis. For the first approach, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test and Granger causality test are used under the framework of Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model, which have almost never been studied for the Myanmar case. (...) The second approach includes the analysis of Myanmar’s foreign trade trend with descriptive statistics. The results show that foreign trade did not generate a significant effect on the economic growth of Myanmar. Rather, import growth was negatively influenced by the economic growth of Myanmar. It is found out that exports had been determined by the GDP growth. Thus, growth-driven export strategy had been applied for the period of 1990-2014. Also, there was only one causal run from export growth to import growth. The results conclude that foreign trade did not have significant impact on the economic growth of Myanmar over the period of 1990–2014. (shrink)

A partir de datos brasileños y españoles, este artículo aborda aspectos relevantes de la donación y el trasplante de órganos, como la relación entre oferta y demanda, la legislación vigente, los costos y las posibles estrategias para aumentar las tasas de donación y mejorar de forma general el proceso de trasplante. El objetivo de este artículo es presentar datos empíricos actuales que incrementen el conocimiento relevante para la evaluación bioética. Los dos países se destacan: Brasil, por poseer el mayor sistema (...) público de trasplante de órganos del mundo; España, por mantener desde hace décadas el mayor índice de donadores efectivos por cada millón de personas. Un análisis inicial de los datos sugiere la necesidad de lidiar más abiertamente con los intereses de los afectados y con la opinión pública, creando una articulación sistémica entre legislación, políticas públicas basadas en evidencias e investigación. (shrink)

In this article we defend a moral conception of cosmopolitanism and its relevance for moral education. Our moral conception of cosmopolitanism presumes that persons possess an inherent dignity in the Kantian sense and therefore they should be recognised as ends‐in‐themselves. We argue that cosmopolitan ideals can inspire moral educators to awaken and cultivate in their pupils an orientation and inclination to struggle against injustice. Moral cosmopolitanism, in other words, should more explicitly inform the work that moral educators do. Real‐world constraints (...) on moral action and the need to prioritise one’s sometimes conflicting responsibilities will often qualify cosmopolitan justice as supererogatory. This fact does not absolve persons from aspiring to see themselves as having the moral obligation to help others in need, while recognising that their factual obligations are more modest in being bound by what they are actually able to do. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem por objetivo mostrar, desde a psicanálise freudiana, um caminho possível que a leva ao encontro da filosofia de orientação fenomenológica. Em O eu e o isso, de 1923, Sigmund Freud emprega uma nova noção pouco explorada na literatura psicanalítica: o eu-corpo. O escopo de nossa análise delimita-se à interpretação e à explicitação da noção de eu-corpo tal como esta foi apresentada por Freud, confrontando-a com a fenomenologia em Merleau-Ponty e Michel Henry. Para tanto, propomos uma análise (...) em quatro tempos. Inicialmente, evidenciaremos o entendimento de Freud sobre o modelo de psicologia originada em Brentano que tem como um de seus desdobramentos a fenomenologia. Depois, mostraremos como a concepção do isso, segundo o próprio texto de Freud, foi determinante para que ele formulasse uma revisão da primeira tópica e a incorporasse em uma segunda tópica. Por fim, nas últimas duas partes, examinaremos o tratamento dado por Merleau-Ponty e Michel Henry à questão do corpo. Concluímos que é possível o encontro entre a psicanálise e a fenomenologia via a noção de eu-corpo freudiano; contudo, tal condução implicará reformulações em teses centrais da psicanálise. (shrink)

CAVALCANTI NETO, Lamartine de Hollanda. Contributions of Thomistic Psychology to the study of the plasticity of the ethos. 2012. 571s. Thesis (Doctorate in Bioethics) – Centro Universitário São Camilo, São Paulo,2012. If Ethics is not a static science, it is because ethos — its basic object of study — is a mutable reality. For this reason, ethical themes, chiefly those of Bioethics, are directly related to the study of the plasticity of the ethos. Nevertheless, such investigation requires that the researcher (...) distance himself from concrete ethical questions, to apply himself to the theoretical examination of what enables the existence and development of such questions — that is, the aforementioned plasticity. However, bibliographical literature on this subject has revealed a scarcity of works focused specifically on the theme. This scarcity seems to indicate that the subject is still in a process of methodological definition. Therefore, we propose as a research question, to investigate at the theoretical level, if Thomistic Psychology can be considered a valid study tool for the plasticity of ethos. For this aim, we adopt a documental and bibliographical research methodology adapted to the aforesaid question, based on the presupposition that such validity can be gauged to the extent that Thomistic Psychology offers objective contributions to the study of the plasticity of the ethos. Backed by extensive literature, we present an overview of Thomistic Psychology, as well as of ethos and its plasticity. With the data obtained, we establish a discussion with a view to identifying these contributions. Based on the results, we close with a reply, while still open, to our research question, hoping to afford, in this way, a kind of platform on which new studies can be developed with greater facility. (shrink)

Abstract: The Pull Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) for precise hy- potheses is applied to a Multivariate Normal Structure (MNS) model. In the FBST we compute the evidence against the precise hypothesis. This evi- dence is the probability of the Highest Relative Surprise Set (HRSS) tangent to the sub-manifold (of the parameter space) that defines the null hypothesis. The MNS model we present appears when testing equivalence conditions for genetic expression measurements, using micro-array technology.

In this article, I aim to demonstrate that moral responsibility theory produces, legitimates, and even magnifies the considerable social injustice that accrues to disabled people insofar as it implicitly and explicitly promotes a depoliticized ontology of disability that construes disability as a naturally disadvantageous personal characteristic or deleterious property of individuals rather than identifies it as an effect of power, an apparatus. In particular, I argue that the methodological tools of “analytic” philosophy that philosophers of moral responsibility theory employ to (...) establish the philosophical domain in which they engage have distinctly detrimental effects on disabled people. (shrink)

This paper presents data on the representation of women at 98 philosophy departments in the United States, which were ranked by the Philosophical Gourmet Report (PGR) in 2015 as well as all of those schools on which data from 2004 exist. The paper makes four points in providing an overview of the state of the field. First, all programs reveal a statistically significant increase in the percentage of women tenured/tenure-track faculty, since 2004. Second, out of the 98 US philosophy departments (...) selected for evaluation by Julie Van Camp in 2004, none in 2015 has 50% women philosophy faculty overall, while one has 50% women who are tenured/tenure track. Third, as of 2015, there is a clear pyramidal shape to the discipline: Women are better represented as Assistant than Associate and as Associate than Full professors. Fourth, women philosophy faculty, especially those who are tenured/tenure track, are better represented at Non-PGR ranked programs than at PGR ranked and PGR Top-20 programs in 2015. (shrink)

In this paper, I interview Francesca De Vecchi (Full Professor of Theoretical Philosophy in Vita-Salute San Raffaele University) about her qualitative ontology and its social and normative implications. If at the foundation of our lifeworld there are significantly qualitative experiences, phenomenology can investigate the most important contemporary issues, such as gender disparity, socio-virtuality depersonalizations and political urgencies.

We introduce what we call the Emergent Model of forgiving, which is a process-based relational model conceptualizing forgiving as moral and normative repair in the wake of grave wrongs. In cases of grave wrongs, which shatter the victim’s life, the Classical Model of transactional forgiveness falls short of illuminating how genuine forgiveness can be achieved. In a climate of persistent threat and distrust, expressions of remorse, rituals and gestures of apology, and acts of reparation are unable to secure the moral (...) confidence and trust required for moral repair, much less for forgiveness. Without the rudiments of a shared moral world — a world in which, at the very least, the survivor’s violation can be collectively recognized as a violation, and her moral status and authority collectively acknowledged and respected — expressions of remorse, gestures and rituals of apology, or promises of compensation have no authority as meaningful communicative acts with reparative significance. Accordingly, we argue that repair in the wake of traumatic violence involves ‘world-building,’ which supports the ability of survivors to move from despair to hope, from radical and disabling distrust to trust and engagement, and thus from impotence to effective agency. Our Emergent Model treats forgiveness as a slowly developing outcome of a series of changes in a person’s relationship to the trauma and its aftermath, in which moral agency is regained. We argue that forgiveness after grave wrongs and world-shattering harm, when it occurs, emerges from other phenomena, such as cohabitation within a community, gestures of reconciliation, working on shared projects, the developing of trust. On this view, forgiveness is an emergent phenomenon; it entails taking and exercising normative power—coming to claim one’s own moral authority in relation to oneself, one’s assailant, and one’s community. The processes that ultimately constitute forgiving are part and parcel of normative repair more broadly construed. (shrink)

Violence against women is a crime that causes countless victims all over the world. Specially when it occurs within the domestic and familiar environment, usually at home and perpetrated by people who are intimately related to the victims, calling the police might not be an option. Despite that, the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro State answers around five thousand calls every month reporting cases of domestic violence against women. But how can the police improve the prevention of such invisible (...) crimes? How to prevent repetition? How to interrupt the cycle of violence? Based on a collaborative approach with stimuli to the behavioral change, the Motivational Interviewing has been broadly used in several areas, including domestic violence. Considering that this approach may contribute to the interruption of the domestic violence cycle, this research how it can be used by the police to tackle and prevent these crimes. Rio de Janeiro State – Brazil, was chosen as the scenario of research considering its leading position in reports of violence against women in the country. The Military Police of this state, is the subject of research, playing an interventive role in the response to emergency calls but also providing the follow-up of the applicable protective measures. (shrink)

Our investigation on Hilary Putnam’s internal realist perspective(internalism) traces parallels and identifies differences between Putnam’s ideasand their antipodes: metaphysical realist (externalism) and radical relativist. Ourresearch has focused upon the contemporary debate in which it is inserted, par-ticularly, upon the challenge that radical relativism to impose on contemporaryepistemology. Such challenge will not be surmounted through classical project tofind absolute certainties. The history of science to point out that theories are notnets that to catch the reality as it is in itself. But (...) this do not to imply that our viewof knowledge are only determined for contingent aspects. In this scenery are hard enterprise but it is worthy-while to take into account efforts of philosophersas Putnam to propose a via media. (shrink)

The study aims to determine the socio-demographic and debt profile of the public-school teachers in the Schools Division of Aklan, Philippines, their reasons on acquiring debt and perceived ways to avoid debts. This study utilized descriptive correlational research design utilizing a researcher-made instrument on socio-demographic profile, pattern of expenditures, debt profile covering the type of debts, total cost of debts, reasons for having debts and perceived ways to manage debts. The data gathered were tabulated and analyzed using the IBM Statistical (...) Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 26. The take-home pay of the teachers was only more than half of their gross income. Most of the spouses of the married teachers were employed but many of them have relatively lower income. Their monthly family income was higher than the reported average family income for 2022 and their expenditures are also relatively higher than the average family expenditures in provinces for 2022. Almost one-half of the income of the teachers was used to pay their debts – both thru automatic payroll deduction and thru personal transactions. The bigger the household size, the higher the expenditure because there were more needs and there were many people consuming commodities. The higher the family income, the bigger the expenditure since lifestyle often adjusts with income. Young; married teachers; those occupying higher position and longer tenure have higher cumulative debts. Increase in family expenditure could cause increase in the number of debts as linked to the Theory of Reasoned Action and Theory of Planned Behavior. High regard for education, health, and safety triggered teachers to have debts, which can only be avoided thru better money and lifestyle management and having additional source of income. (shrink)

The Plant Ontology (PO) is a community resource consisting of standardized terms, definitions, and logical relations describing plant structures and development stages, augmented by a large database of annotations from genomic and phenomic studies. This paper describes the structure of the ontology and the design principles we used in constructing PO terms for plant development stages. It also provides details of the methodology and rationale behind our revision and expansion of the PO to cover development stages for all plants, particularly (...) the land plants (bryophytes through angiosperms). As a case study to illustrate the general approach, we examine variation in gene expression across embryo development stages in Arabidopsis and maize, demonstrating how the PO can be used to compare patterns of expression across stages and in developmentally different species. Although many genes appear to be active throughout embryo development, we identified a small set of uniquely expressed genes for each stage of embryo development and also between the two species. Evaluating the different sets of genes expressed during embryo development in Arabidopsis or maize may inform future studies of the divergent developmental pathways observed in monocotyledonous versus dicotyledonous species. The PO and its annotation databasemake plant data for any species more discoverable and accessible through common formats, thus providing support for applications in plant pathology, image analysis, and comparative development and evolution. (shrink)